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Congress, the Courts, and Party
Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks
the President and Why the Courts Should Not
Take Congress’s Place
Neal Devins∗
This essay will make two points about Congress-President
relations—one is clearly right and the other is debatable. One
point (clearly right) is that Congress is generally uninterested in
the Constitution, especially with regard to asserting its
institutional prerogatives and checking presidential unilateralism.
This was largely the case before polarization set in (around 1995)
and polarization has significantly exacerbated this phenomenon. In
particular, lawmakers from the president’s political party no
longer assert institutional prerogatives to resist presidential
encroachments; consequently, Congress cannot act in a
bipartisan way to block presidential initiatives. The second point
(debatable) is that courts should not relax standing to sue
limitations so that disappointed lawmakers can take their
grievances to the judiciary when Congress is unable to stand up
for itself. Polarization may make it harder for Congress to check
the president, but polarization also cuts against lawmakers (or
even institutional counsel) speaking Congress’s voice in court.1
More than that, polarization has fueled the growing perception
that the court itself is polarized and politicized—so much so that
the courts have good reason to steer from this political thicket.
In making these points, I will focus my attention on how
Congress turns to the courts to assert its institutional
prerogatives. Section I will talk generally about structural and
practical limits to Congress advancing a pro-Congress theory of
either statutory or constitutional interpretation before the courts.
∗ Sandra Day O’Connor Professor of Law and Professor of Government, William and
Mary School of Law. Thanks to Tom Campbell for asking me to be a part of this
symposium and for his insights.
1 When a House or Senate committee seeks to enforce a subpoena in court, the
committee is speaking its own voice and not Congress’s voice. See Tara Leigh Grove &
Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
571, 622 (2014). For this reason, the broader point I make against lawmaker efforts to
speak Congress’s voice in court does not apply to committee enforcement of subpoenas.
See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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The centralization of litigation authority in the Department of
Justice is a manifestation of these limits. Section I will also
explain how it is that Congress sought to combat these limits in
separation of powers disputes with the executive—giving itself
some institutional voice in court by creating the Office of House
Counsel and the Senate Office of Legal Counsel. Section II will
examine how both lawmakers and institutional counsel have
become less and less interested in separation of powers disputes
as Congress has become more polarized. In particular,
lawmakers have shifted away from institutional pursuits and
toward the pursuit of social issues that divide the parties. In
making this point, I will also highlight how party polarization
has transformed Congress—from mildly disinclined to think
about its institutional prerogatives under the Constitution, to
outright uninterested in protecting its role in our system of
divided government. Correspondingly, lawmakers of the
president’s party no longer use their oversight authority to check
the president; lawmakers of the opposition party see oversight
principally as a vehicle to embarrass their political opponents.
Section III will consider the ramifications of increasing party
polarization on the standing of lawmakers and institutional
counsel in disputes with the executive. These disputes are
increasingly visible; opposition party lawmakers have strong
incentive to discredit the president and frustrate his agenda.
Litigation is a visible, low cost way to pursue their interests. For
this very reason, however, litigation exacerbates polarization and
threatens the judiciary. The judicial role in checking the
executive should not expand to take into account Congress’s
failure to assert its institutional prerogatives through traditional
Article I devices, most notably, oversight and legislation.2
I. WHY CONGRESS (PRETTY MUCH) LEAVES IT TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO DEFEND CONGRESS’S INTERESTS
IN COURT3
The competing incentives of the president and Congress
explain both Congress’s disinterest in asserting its institutional
2 My argument will be limited to the question of whether polarization—as a policy
matter—cuts in favor of more expansive standing for lawmakers and institutional
counsel. I will not engage in constitutional analysis to ascertain the appropriate scope of
lawmaker or institutional standing. For recent treatments of this constitutional question,
see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2014);
Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV.
339 (2015); and Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1253 (2017).
3 This Section builds on and occasionally borrows from earlier writings of mine,
most notably, Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1495 (2017).
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prerogatives and the related dynamics of Congress’s interface
with both the executive and the courts. To start, presidents are
well positioned to simultaneously advance policy goals and
expand the power of the presidency. In particular, presidents
always claim they are constitutionally authorized to pursue
favored policy positions and, as such, presidents are consistent
and persistent advocates of executive power. Political scientists
Terry Moe and William Howell put it this way: “[W]hen
presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can
put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in
gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of
their power.”4
For its part, Congress possesses ample weapons to defend its
institutional interests, but has little incentive to make use
of these tools. While each of Congress’s 535 members have
some stake in Congress as an institution, lawmakers regularly
trade-off their interest in Congress as a strong, vibrant
institution. They put aside institutional interests in favor of their
interests in reelection, in serving on a desired committee, in
assuming a position of leadership in their party, or in advancing
their and their constituents’ policy goals. Lawmakers, in other
words, are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power,
but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the
local constituency.”5
This collective action problem stymies Congress in two
distinctive ways. First (and most obviously), lawmakers have
little interest in defending congressional prerogatives. On war
powers, for example, lawmakers rarely assert Congress’s
constitutional powers. In particular, today’s military is all
volunteer and generally supportive of presidential power;
lawmakers feel little constituent or public pressure to reign in
presidential warmaking.6 Consequently, notwithstanding the
clear constitutional mandate that Congress “declare war,”7
lawmakers often find it more convenient to acquiesce to
presidential unilateralism than to face criticism that they
obstructed a necessary military operation.8
4 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999).
5 Id. at 144.
6 Neal Devins, Bring Back the Draft?, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2003).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
8 See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 166–68
(2000). For this very reason, institutionally-minded members of Congress have turned to
the courts to preserve their constitutional powers. For one prominent example, see
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000), which holds that members of
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Second, the policy interests of lawmakers are not necessarily
in sync with the institutional interests of Congress. Lawmakers
opposed to legislation on policy grounds often embrace a narrow
view of congressional power. Indeed, constitutional objections to
legislation are typically raised by lawmakers and those who
oppose legislation on policy grounds.9 Examples abound,
including the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act,
and the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act. Lawmakers opposed
to these statutes filed briefs arguing that Congress was without
constitutional authority to enact these measures. 10
With little interest in abstract discussions of legislative
power, there clearly is no appetite for pursuing institutional
goals such as enhancing pro-Congress interpretations of the
Constitution or federal statutes. Likewise, lawmakers have little
interest in contemplating potential judicial review of their
handiwork—policy goals are pursued when a bill is enacted and a
court decision striking down legislation is seen as an opportunity
to reassert policy priorities through the enactment of new
legislation.11 When amending legislation in the wake of a judicial
decision, lawmakers do not engage with the courts; they rather
“make[] clear concessions to the Court’s decision” by embracing
the same policy through alternative means.12 As Second Circuit
Judge Robert Katzmann put it, “Congress is largely oblivious of
the well-being of the judiciary as an institution.”13 Consider, for
example, issues of statutory interpretation that cut to the core of
congressional priorities and prerogatives. The simple fact is that
“[n]o one ever lost an election by saying ‘I’m for purposivism’”;14
Congress could not sue President Bill Clinton for alleged violations of the War Powers
Resolution in his handling of the war in Yugoslavia. For additional discussion, see infra
Section III, which argues that institutionally-focused lawsuits are a rarity and that most
lawmakers seek partisan advantage through litigation.
9 See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE
IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 143–44 (2004).
10 See generally Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons
from Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933 (2015).
For reasons I will detail in Section II, polarization exacerbates this phenomenon, as
today’s lawmakers are more apt to file briefs and make other formal declaration that
Congress has exceeded its powers.
11 See PICKERILL, supra note 9, at 23.
12 Id. at 49.
13 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY
7 (1988).
14 Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 TEX. L. REV. 205, 214 (2014).
In 2016, congressional Republicans pursued legislation that would eviscerate judicial
deference to agency interpretations. See Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the
Proposed “Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times,
JUSTIA: VERDICT (July 26, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deferenceproposed-separation-powers-restoration-act-2016-sign-times [http://perma.cc/DVG4-WFF9].
When introduced, this bill—which was never taken up in the Senate—sought to call
attention to the “lawless” Obama administration; lawmakers were not concerned with
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and with no constituency payoff, there is no lawmaker interest
in thinking about statutory interpretation techniques used by
the courts.
A.

Congress and the Department of Justice
Another manifestation of lawmaker uninterest in
institutional power, including judicial review of Congress’s
handiwork, is the centralization of litigation authority in the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). First, although the defense of
federal statutes is an executive function,15 Congress limits its
influence over legal arguments made in court by centralizing
litigation authority this way. Second (and somewhat relatedly),
the entity within Congress that oversees the Justice Department
(the House and Senate Judiciary Committees) have incentive to
embrace judicial supremacy—potentially at the expense of proCongress theories of interpretation. Neither of these claims is
obvious, so let me provide more details.
First, by centralizing litigation authority in the DOJ, subject
matter committees in Congress focus their energies on
policymaking; for most lawmakers, what matters is direct
influence through the writing of laws, the holding of hearings,
and related investigations.16 Unlike legislation and oversight,
legal arguments made in court are abstract and indirect.
Historically, however, Congress understood that decentralized
lawyering enhanced lawmaker power vis-à-vis the executive.
Before 1870, there was no DOJ; before 1933, powerful agency
solicitors controlled statutory and administrative legal
arguments.17 These solicitors had strong ties with congressional
oversight committees and, at this time, oversight committees
held greater sway with executive branch legal arguments.18
Recognizing the costs of decentralization to executive power,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt reorganized executive branch
litigation, transferring litigation authority from agency solicitors
congressional power, and indeed the bill sought to sift power to the courts, not Congress.
In July 2017, the bill was reintroduced by Senate Republicans. See Press Release,
Orrin Hatch, Senate Leaders Introduce Bill to Restore Regulatory Accountability
(July 19, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/7/senate-leadersintroduce-bill-to-restore-regulatory-accountability [http://perma.cc/R32G-23RD].
15 For reasons why I think this is so, see Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 625. For a
competing perspective, see Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s (Less) Limited Power to
Represent Itself in Court: A Comment on Grove and Devins, 99 CORN. L. REV. ONLINE 166,
168 (2014).
16 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White
House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1998).
17 See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 62–63 (1992).
18 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 207.
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to the DOJ.19 In so doing, presidents—through their Attorneys
General—have greater control of the administrative state. In
particular, unlike agency solicitors (who are more beholden to
oversight committee chairs than to the White House), the
Attorney General is typically a close political ally of the
president, often involved in the president’s personal and political
life.20 Correspondingly, since the mission of DOJ attorneys is to
defend the interests of the United States (rather than a single
agency whose interests may be in conflict with other agencies),
there is less chance that either narrow constituent interests or
congressional committees will capture the DOJ. Indeed,
defenders of centralized litigation authority highlight the
perceived need for the government to make consistent legal
arguments across a range of cases.21 More to the point, “DOJ
attorneys may well see the president as their client.”22 Indeed, as
Sai Prakash and I have examined in our study of DOJ refusals to
defend federal statutes, the DOJ fends off agency rivals and
thereby enhances its status within the executive by advancing a
pro-president legal policy agenda.23
Congress’s willingness to go along with DOJ control of
litigation is a byproduct of the intensity of preferences within
Congress and the executive branch. For reasons already noted,
presidents push for centralization of litigation authority in the
DOJ. The DOJ too is a fierce advocate for centralization; the
power and prestige of the DOJ is tied to litigation authority,
and the DOJ’s preference to control litigation far exceeds
departmental and agency interests in decentralized
arrangements. After all, agency heads have substantial power to
advance policy preferences through their power to regulate and
19 See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
256–58 (1996).
20 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219.
21 For a summary of DOJ arguments in support of centralized litigation authority,
see The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Att’y Gen.
47 (1982). For a fuller presentation and critique of those arguments, see Neal Devins &
Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558 (2003).
22 Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Government
Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987).
The DOJ, however, is not simply a lackey of the president; witness, in particular, the
battle between President Trump and his DOJ.
23 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 537–59 (2012); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097,
1105–06 (2013). In making this point, a distinction must be drawn between DOJ efforts to
advance the president’s legal policy agenda and possible DOJ investigations into criminal
conduct by high-ranking executive officials. The power of the DOJ is hinged both to its
advocacy of the executive’s legal policy agenda and its reputation for neutrality in the
pursuit of criminal investigations.
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their work with congressional committees in shaping federal
law.24 More significantly, the DOJ’s overseers in Congress are
strong supporters of centralization. The power of the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees is significantly moored to the
power of the DOJ and, as such, the Judiciary Committees look for
ways to strengthen DOJ control of litigation. For example, when
other congressional committees contemplate shifting litigation
authority away from DOJ and to a regulatory agency, the
Judiciary Committees fight back. Michael Herz and I recount
several such episodes in our study of DOJ centralization of
litigation authority, including fights between the House
Judiciary and Energy and Commerce Committees regarding the
enforcement of environmental laws.25
The interests of the DOJ and Judiciary Committees also
coalesce on judicial supremacy. Both are strong advocates of
judicial power as the power of the DOJ and Judiciary
Committees is moored to the courts. When the federal courts play
a significant policy-making role, the power of the DOJ to speak
the government’s voice is at its apex, as is the power of the
Judiciary Committees to oversee the DOJ. For this very reason,
the DOJ embraces a duty to defend federal statutes that sees the
Supreme Court as speaking the last word on the Constitution’s
meaning; as a result, the Senate Judiciary Committee typically
demands that Solicitor General and Attorney General nominees
formally commit to the defense of federal statutes.26
Furthermore, Judiciary Committee members demonstrate
respect for basic legal principles, “adher[ing] to formal rules
against interfering in any way with ongoing litigation, and
maintain[ing] a general policy that no bill should take effect
retroactively.”27 In other words, unlike power committees who
pay no attention to potential judicial roadblocks to favored
policy initiatives, the Judiciary Committees are court-centric
and conform to—rather than challenge—judicial limits on
congressional power.28

24 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219 (explaining why agencies do not see
litigation authority as core to their powers); see also Devins, supra note 3, at 1528–30
(highlighting agency role in drafting legislation).
25 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 221–22.
26 For a discussion of DOJ views, see The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and
Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275 (1980). For a
general discussion of the incentives of the DOJ, Congress, and the White House, see
Devins & Prakash, supra note 23, at 538–59.
27 Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 317, 338 (1993).
28 See id. at 317–62 (contrasting House Judiciary Committee to Energy and
Commerce Committee).
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B.

Congress in Court
The fact that Congress largely leaves it to the DOJ to speak
the government’s voice in court does not mean that lawmakers
never turn to the courts for recourse. In Section II, I will discuss
lawmaker amicus filings as well as the practices of institutional
counsel for the House and Senate—analysis that will highlight
how party polarization has contributed to declining lawmaker
interest in Congress’s institutional authority vis-à-vis the
president. In Section III, I will discuss court-imposed limits on
the standing of disappointed lawmakers to defend Congress’s
institutional prerogatives. For the balance of this section,
I will examine the political conditions that led to the
establishment of institutional counsel—conditions that speak to
the circumstances when Congress will overcome the disincentives
that typically result in lawmaker disinterest in Congress’s
institutional authority.
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel was created by statute in
1978 as part of Watergate-era reforms to bolster congressional
interests in separation of powers disputes; the Office of House
Counsel was created by an administrative directive of the House
Speaker Tip O’Neill in 1976.29 Differences between the two offices
reflect differences in the chambers. The House is controlled by
the majority party and the House counsel essentially works for
the majority party.30 Senate norms traditionally favor
bipartisanship and the Senate counsel acts at the behest of a
supermajority of members from both parties.31 Indeed, Senate
norms of bipartisanship explain the unwillingness of the House
to sign onto a joint congressional counsel that would serve both

29 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 608–14. In addition to creating an Office of
Senate Legal Counsel, Congress also mandates that the DOJ notify that office when it
would not defend federal statutes (principally so that institutional counsel could defend
congressional interests in separation of powers disputes). See 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006)
(allowing the Senate counsel—when authorized—to appear in legal actions regarding “the
powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution”). The House
Bipartisanship Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) directs the House counsel. See Grove &
Devins, supra note 1, at 618. The BLAG is controlled by the majority party and has
always backed majority party preferences.
30 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19. In litigation defending the Defense
of Marriage Act, the House counsel responded to Democratic complaints that it did not
speak the voice of the entire House by acknowledging that it represents the views of the
majority party. Id. In lower court filings, the counsel stated that although it “seeks
consensus whenever possible, it functions on a majoritarian basis, like the institution it
represents.” E.g., Brief for Defendant–Appellant the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the United States House of Representatives, Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-2335), 2012 WL 3647722, at *3 n.1.
31 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 612–21 (noting that Senate counsel action
must be approved by two-thirds of a group made up of four members of the majority party
and three members of the minority party).
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chambers and serve as a bulwark against presidential power.32
Notwithstanding arguments that “[n]either House acting alone
can assert the prerogative of representing the Congress,”33 House
leadership feared that a nonpartisan joint office might not give
voice to majority preferences in the House.
The willingness of lawmakers to back the creation of an
Office of Senate Legal Counsel to advance the Senate’s
institutional interests in the courts is a byproduct of unique
political circumstances—so much so that the creation of this
office is the exception, which proves the rule of lawmaker
disinterest in protecting their institutional prerogatives. During
the Watergate era (1972–1978), Democrats occupied every
ideological niche and there were several liberal Republicans.34
For this reason, George Wallace justified his third-party bid for
the presidency by claiming that “there was not a ‘dime’s worth of
difference’ between the two parties.”35 Senate committees, for
example, often made use of unified staff—rather than divide staff
by majority or minority party.36 With no meaningful ideological
gap between the parties, bipartisanship was possible and
Congress sometimes saw itself as an institution with a distinctive
set of interests that set it apart from the White House.
Nonetheless, lawmakers still needed to see personal political
advantage in asserting Congress’s institutional interests and, as
such, the previously discussed collective action problem typically
stood as a roadblock to Congress’s asserting institutional
interests, especially on matters as abstract as litigation
authority. Watergate, however, made fears of presidential
overreach politically salient and lawmakers rallied behind
several significant legislative proposals designed to limit
the president and protect Congress.37 Congress enacted the

32 See id. at 612–13; see also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Legal Counsel for Congress:
Protecting Institutional Interests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131 (1993).
33 Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest
Matters: Hearing on S. 555 Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95TH CONG. 61
(1977) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk, D–S.D.).
34 See SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 27–35 (2008); see
also S TEVEN S. S MITH & G ERALD G AMM, The Dynamics of Party Government in
Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 147–49 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce L. Oppenheimer
eds., 9th ed. 2009).
35 Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79 in Alabama, WASH. POST
(Sept. 15, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1998/09/15/ex-gov-georgec-wallace-dies-at-79-in-alabama/f77a36e4-0689-4086-9b96-b0d9a293cd57/?utm_term=.f39
de6268e8c [http://perma.cc/4CEW-DRM5].
36 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1543 (2005).
37 See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why
Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 401–06 (2009).

Do Not Delete

64

3/11/18 3:22 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

War Powers Resolution (overriding a presidential veto),38 the
1974 Impoundment Control Act,39 and the 1978 Ethics in
Government Act.40 All these statutes were politically popular; all
these statutes responded to presidential overreach of core
legislative powers.
In Section II, I will explain why today’s Congress lacks the
will and the way to assert institutional prerogative against the
executive. Before doing so, let me close this section out
by highlighting ways that institutional counsel—before
polarization set in—defended congressional prerogatives in court.
In the 1970s and 1980s, lawmakers were more willing to embrace
a unified view of Congress’s institutional prerogatives. In
particular, rather than see themselves as Democrats or
Republicans, lawmakers were sanguine with institutional
counsel defending the constitutionality of federal statutes or
seeking to enforce committee subpoenas against executive
officials. Consider, for example, Congress’s participation in two
Reagan-era separation of powers disputes, Immigration
and Naturalization Services v. Chadha (legislative veto) and
Bowsher v. Synar (deficit reduction).41 In both cases, counsel for
the House and Senate participated in oral arguments and filed
briefs supporting Congress.42 In both cases, party identity did
not matter—majority Democrats in Chadha initially litigated
the dispute against the Carter administration; majority
Senate Republicans litigated the Synar dispute against the
Reagan administration.43
The ability and willingness of institutional counsel to
advance Congress’s institutional interests in a bipartisan way, as
we will see, stands in stark contrast to practices in today’s
polarized Congress. At the same time, the participation of
institutional counsel in earlier separation of powers disputes
should not be seen as a departure from this section’s central
claims about lawmaker uninterest in institutional authority
and lawmaker acquiescence to judicial supremacy. To start,
institutional counsel embraced separation of powers litigation
and believed in judicial supremacy. At the time of Chadha
and Bowsher, the status of the lawyers in these offices
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (1973).
Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 682–88 (1974).
40 Ethics in Government Act, P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
41 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
42 See Devins, supra note 10, at 950.
43 In Chadha, no member of Congress filed an amicus brief. In Bowsher, there were
two amicus briefs filed—one in support of the statute and one in opposition of the statute.
These briefs were bipartisan. See id. at 1017–19.
38
39
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hinged on their participation in marque separation of powers
disputes—high profile cases where they were arguing against top
DOJ lawyers, cases which often made their way to the Supreme
Court.44 In the case of the Senate counsel, the very purpose of her
office was to provide a bipartisan institutional voice to Senate
interests in separation of powers disputes against the
president.45 Likewise, the power of these lawyers derives from
the power of the courts; institutional counsel pursue high
visibility cases in court and embrace the Court’s power to say
what the law is. For their part, lawmakers in the pre-polarization
era were generally uninterested in the work of institutional
counsel and acquiesced to a system that largely ran itself. In
other words, after lawmakers put in place institutional counsel in
the Watergate era, lawmakers did not see these offices as
partisan tools and passively went along with the efforts of these
offices to advance Congress’s institutional interests in court.46
II. HOW PARTY POLARIZATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO GROWING
LAWMAKER DISINTEREST IN CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES
Section I highlighted the collective action problem that limits
lawmaker interest in institutional power disputes, including
lawmaker support of DOJ control of government litigation.
Section I also explained the creation of institutional counsel for
Congress in the Watergate era, highlighting how the political
salience of presidential power disputes overcame collective action
limitations. In this section, I will focus on today’s polarized
Congress. I will highlight how polarization exacerbates the
collective action problem. I will also look to changing practices in
both institutional counsel litigation and lawmaker amicus filings
to document the diminishing salience of institutional power
disputes to members of Congress.
A.

Polarization and the Collective Action Problem
Polarization diminishes the ability of lawmakers to work
together to defend Congress’s institutional prerogatives. Unlike
the Watergate era, today’s lawmakers increasingly identify with
party-defined messages and seek to gain power by advancing
44 I speak from personal experience. In 1985, I had preliminary conversations with
then-Senate counsel Mike Davidson about working in his office.
45 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 611–13.
46 I certainly do not mean to suggest that all lawmakers were disengaged in
separation of powers disputes. During the pre-polarization period, there were certainly
institutionally-minded members in the House or Senate who cared deeply about
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. At the same time, these members were a fairly
small minority and most members were subject to the collective action problem discussed
earlier in this section.
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within their respective party.47 Correspondingly, Republicans
and Democrats are increasingly at odds with each other and
increasingly unlikely to find common ground. Measures of
ideology reveal that all or nearly all Republicans are more
conservative than the most conservative Democrats.48 Likewise,
with the demise of Northern Rockefeller Republicans and
Southern Democrats, there is no meaningful ideological range
within either party.49
The rise in party-line voting exemplifies this phenomenon.
Unlike the Nixon impeachment (where—even before the release
of Watergate tapes—seven of seventeen Republicans joined
House Democrats in voting for articles of impeachment),50 the
“virtual party line votes in the House and the Senate” during the
Clinton impeachment “reinforce[d] public perception of the
intense partisanship underlying the proceedings.”51 The filibuster
is another example. In November 2013, the then-Democratic
Senate made it more likely that presidential lower court
nominations would be approved by repealing the filibuster
for those nominees; in April 2017, the Republican Senate
likewise made it more likely that presidential Supreme Court
nominations would be approved by repealing the Supreme Court
filibuster rule.52 These examples, while striking, typify current
practice: House Republicans vote with their party around
47 See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration
of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 756–59 (2011); see also C. LAWRENCE
EVANS, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 238
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
48 See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTE VIEW (Jan. 18, 2013),
web.archive.org/web/20131116022958/http://polarizedamerica.com/political_polarization.asp.
49 See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 305, 314–15 (2003).
50 See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 161, 255 (2007). Republicans and Democrats also came
together in subpoenaing information from the executive and going to court to seek
enforcement of that subpoena. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For additional discussion, see
Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 600–01.
51 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 193 (2d ed. 2000).
52 See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://nyti.ms/17Qt6DG; see also Amy Davidson Sorkin, Gorsuch
Wins, The Filibuster Loses, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/amy-davidson/gorsuch-wins-the-filibuster-loses [http://perma.cc/3PHE-CAEJ]. In
September 2017, Senate Republicans threatened to do away with the so-called blue slip, a
practice which allows Senators from the state of residence of a federal judicial nominee to
delay or potentially block a vote on the nominee. See Karoun Demirjian, McConnell Wants
to End Practice of Allowing Senators to Block Appeals Court Judges, WASH. POST
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-gop-leader-wants-toend-practice-of-allowing-senators-to-block-circuit-court-judges/2017/09/13/d10aa028-98d911e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.81217b34d9a0 [http://perma.cc/UQZ9-AR5U].
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ninety-two percent of the time and Senate Democrats vote with
their party around ninety-four percent of the time.53
When it comes to oversight and hearings, party identity is
also key. Majority and minority staff no longer work together;
each side, instead, calls witnesses who support preexisting party
views.54 Oversight too is contingent on party identity. When the
majority party is the same as the president, oversight is lax;
when the government is divided, oversight is a top priority.55
Correspondingly, the House majority is willing to seek judicial
enforcement of subpoenas against high-ranking executive
officials during periods of divided government. When Democrats
controlled the House in 2007, the Bush administration’s firing of
U.S. attorneys prompted extensive oversight and litigation.56 In
the Fast and Furious gun running case of 2012–2013,
Republicans targeted Obama Attorney General Eric Holder.57 In
both these disputes, the minority filed competing briefs urging
judicial restraint.58
Party polarization, finally and most significantly, contributes
both to the rise of presidential unilateralism and to Congress’s
acquiescence to judicial supremacy. Members of the president’s
party are unlikely to check presidential priorities and,
consequently, the opposition party is unlikely to forge a
bipartisan coalition to check presidential power.59 Moreover, the
53 Elahe Izadi, Congress Sets Record for Voting Along Party Lines, NAT’L. J. (Feb. 3,
2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/62617 [http://perma.cc/9GLY-ND99].
54 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1544 (2005).
55 See Devins, supra note 37, at 409.
56 See Philip Shenon, As New ‘Cop on the Beat,’ Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/us/politics/06waxman.html.
57 See John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Holder Held in Contempt of Congress,
POLITICO (June 28, 2012, 5:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/holder-held-incontempt-of-congress-077988 [http://perma.cc/8STK-YLEE]. Another manifestation of
polarization’s impact on Executive Branch-Congress dynamics is the March 2018 decision
of the Trump administration to turn over Obama-era documents on the Fast and Furious
investigation to Republican-led Congress. See Sarah N. Lynch, Trump administration to
provide records on Obama-era gun-smuggling probe, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2018, 9:21 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-guns/trump-administration-to-providerecords-on-obama-era-gun-smuggling-probe-idUSKCN1GJ2KH [http://perma.cc/DL54-VBTK].
58 See Jordy Yager, Dems File Brief Urging Court to Dismiss Issa’s Contempt Suit
Against Holder, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:34 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house
/273827-dems-file-brief-urging-court-to-dismiss-issas-contempt-suit-against-holder.com
[http://perma.cc/MN5W-KP94]. The partisan divide in these cases stands in sharp
contrast to the bipartisan efforts of the Watergate-era Congress to go to court to enforce a
subpoena against President Nixon. For additional discussion, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
59 I do not mean to suggest that the president’s party will never stand up to the
president. In 2017, Republicans in Congress joined Democrats to back sanctions
legislation against Russia for its meddling in the 2016 elections—legislation which was
seen as a rebuke to President Trump. See Elana Schor, Congress Sends Russia
Sanctions to Trump Desk, Daring a Veto, POLITICO (July 27, 2017, 1:55 PM),

Do Not Delete

68

3/11/18 3:22 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

prospects of both parties coming together to advance Congress’s
institutional interests through the enactment of legislation is less
likely in divided government (and we have had divided
government thirty-six of the past fifty years). The result:
presidents act unilaterally and Congress stands aside. Sometimes
presidents advance new policies through executive orders (Clinton
on health care; Bush on faith based initiatives; Obama on
immigration);60 sometimes presidents take greater control of the
administrative state through Office of Management and Budget
regulatory review and related coordinating techniques.61
Polarization facilitates judicial supremacy for much the same
reason. Lawmakers are increasingly at odds about preferred
policies; on matters before the courts, lawmakers—as I will soon
discuss—increasingly file conflicting Democrat and Republican
amicus briefs. Consequently, courts are emboldened, as it is close
to unimaginable that lawmakers will stand together to advance
pro-Congress positions in ways that courts would take into
account.62 Polarization furthers judicial supremacy in other ways.
For example, polarization has resulted in a shift of power away
from congressional committees and to party leaders—so much
so that committee hearings related to constitutional and
statutory interpretation are now dominated by the court-centric
Judiciary Committees.63
B.

Polarization and Amicus Briefs64
Lawmakers regularly file amicus briefs in federal court
litigation, especially before the Supreme Court. From 1974–1985,
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/russia-sanctions-bill-senate-to-pass-241034
[http://perma.cc/TM7H-4FQH]. At the same time, my bottom line claim is valid, that is,
today’s lawmakers rarely have incentive to check a president of their own party. Indeed,
Congressional Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit his own
Department of Justice and FBI by releasing memos and conducting oversight favorable to
the president. See also infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Republican
support for President Trump during the first months of his presidency). For a provocative
argument that Congress retains its core powers to check the president and that the
failure to act speaks more about the situational use of power (rather than the diminution
of power tied to polarization), see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION:
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017).
60 See Moe and Howell, supra note 4, at 165–66 (noting that only 3 of 1000 executive
orders from 1973–1998 were overridden by legislation). For a more complete (and current)
inventory, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 112–20 (2003).
61 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 H ARV . L. R EV . 2245,
2247–49 (2001).
62 See Devins, supra note 3, at 1518–19; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 14–17 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court calibrates its
decisions to take into account the possibility of congressional disapproval).
63 See Devins, supra note 36, at 762–63.
64 This subsection is drawn from Devins, supra note 10.
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930 lawmakers signed onto fifty-two briefs in forty-five cases;
from 2002–2013, those numbers skyrocketed—3807 lawmakers
signed onto one hundred fifty briefs in eighty-six cases.65 This
spike in filings, however, does not speak to greater lawmaker
interest in Congress’s institutional authority, nor greater
congressional influence before the Court. In fact, differences
between the less polarized 1974–1985 period and the highly
polarized 2002–2013 period speak both to the rise of partisanship
in lawmaker briefs and a shift away from less divisive separation
of powers cases to salient divisive issues like abortion, health
care, and gay rights. During the 1974–1985 period, fifteen briefs
(twenty-nine percent) were filed on social issues and twenty
(thirty-eight percent) were filed on institutional issues.66 During
the 2002–2013 period, fifty-two (thirty-five percent) were filed on
social issues and forty-three (twenty-nine percent) were filed on
institutional issues.67 Individual lawmakers were twice as likely
to sign onto social issue briefs (1822 lawmakers; forty-eight
percent) than institutional briefs (926 signatories; twenty-four
percent).68 In the earlier period, lawmakers signed onto
comparable numbers of social and institutional issue briefs (388
lawmakers, forty-two percent for social issue briefs; 372
lawmakers, forty percent for institutional).69
More striking, today’s lawmakers focus almost exclusively on
the underlying policy dispute. Briefs are filed in cases that do not
implicate congressional power (affirmative action and legislative
prayer are two recent examples).70 The question of whether
congressional power is expanded or limited is of secondary
importance. Democrats backed the Affordable Care Act and
campaign finance laws and opposed the Defense of Marriage Act;
Republicans were on the opposite side of both issues.71
A closer look at abortion and separation of powers filings
backs up these claims. For abortion, lawmakers did not file any
amicus briefs in cases implicating state regulatory authority
until 1986; in 1980, a bipartisan coalition of 238 lawmakers (104
Democrats, 135 Republicans) filed a brief arguing that lawmaker
control over the appropriations process extended to the decision
not to fund abortions.72 Starting in 1986, however, lawmakers
Id. at 942–43.
Id. at 945–46.
67 Id. at 946.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 995–96, 999–1000.
71 Id. at 992–94, 998–99.
72 See Brief of Rep. Jim Wright et al. as Amici Curiae, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (No. 79-1268), 1980 WL 339672, at *1–5.
65
66
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began to file in state as well as federal cases; partisan divisions
also emerged. Initially, competing briefs were filed by coalitions
dominated by Republicans or Democrats (pro-choice briefs were
ninety percent Democrats and pro-life briefs were ninety percent
Republicans).73 By 2014, most briefs were exclusively Democrat
or Republican filings. In the 2014 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case
(involving the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act),
four of five briefs were one party briefs.74
Abortion briefs are striking for another reason—hundreds of
lawmakers sign onto these briefs (an average of 171 signatories
per case).75 In other words, lawmakers see abortion briefs as an
opportunity to register a policy preference on an issue that
divides the party. Lawmakers no longer care whether the
underlying issue implicates state or federal power. More striking,
even in cases implicating federal power, lawmakers now care
only about pro-choice or pro-life preferences and not about the
scope of federal power. Today, it is inconceivable that a broad
bipartisan coalition would back legislative power—as they did in
the 1980 abortion funding case.76 Instead, Democrats will resist
federal power to restrict abortion rights and back federal power
to guarantee abortion access; Republican views of federal power
are likewise contingent on whether pro-choice or pro-life policy
outcomes are at play. In the 2007 Gonzales v. Carhart case,
for example, Republicans uniformly backed and Democrats
uniformly resisted congressional power to impose a federal
partial birth abortion ban.77
Amicus filings in separation of powers cases highlight both
the growth of partisanship and the declining importance of
separation of powers issues to lawmakers. As noted, today’s
lawmakers are less likely to participate in disputes implicating
institutional power and less likely to sign onto briefs in cases
where briefs are filed. While House and Senate counsel
participation may deflate the number of signatories (a topic I will
address in the next subsection), it is quite clear that there is less
Devins, supra note 10, at 947.
Id. at 948.
75 Id. One hundred and seventy-one is the average number of briefs studied in my
earlier research on congressional amici.
76 In 2014, House Republican leadership filed a lawsuit against Obama
administration implementation of the Affordable Care Act—claiming that the
administration usurped Congress’s appropriations power. For their part, Democratic
leadership filed competing briefs—advancing a narrower view of the appropriations
power. See Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53
(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844.
77 Devins, supra note 10, at 1014–15. All 152 Republican signatories supported the
law. Ninety-nine out of one hundred and one Democrat signatories opposed.
73
74
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interest in staking out a position in a separation of powers
dispute than a case implicating abortion or some other social
issue. For example, throughout the enemy combatant dispute, a
total of sixteen lawmakers signed amicus briefs and no amicus
briefs were filed by the House or Senate counsel.78 Additionally,
when an amicus brief is filed, there are relatively few brief
signers—roughly nineteen per brief as compared to 171 in
abortion cases.79
Separation of powers filings are revealing for other reasons.80
First, there is a growing trend towards partisan filings; recent
examples include George W. Bush litigation over enemy
combatants, Barack Obama litigation over recess appointments
and immigration, Donald Trump litigation over immigration.81
Second, although some bipartisan briefs were filed, lawmakers
were not motivated by a desire to preserve or expand
congressional power. In litigation over the item veto in the 1990s,
lawmakers defended delegating legislative power to the president
in order to facilitate their reputations as deficit hawks.82 In
related 2012 and 2014 litigation over the authority of Congress to
allow individuals born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their place of
birth, brief signers were interested in reaffirming their support
for Israel.83
Lawmaker amicus briefs reflect growing polarization in
Congress, including growing lawmaker disinterest in issues
implicating Congress’s institutional power. Moreover, with
increasing attention paid to short-term goals tied to advancing
party policy priorities, lawmakers are increasingly apt to
file briefs highlighting limits in legislative power. Relatedly,
today’s amicus briefs largely cancel each other out—coalitions
of Democrats and Republicans make competing arguments
about constitutionality so that there are roughly as many
briefs arguing that Congress is without authority as arguing
that Congress has constitutional authority. And if that isn’t
enough—these briefs are further limited by the fact that
Republicans and Democrats are inconsistent in their positions
Id. at 949.
Id. at 948. Nineteen is the average number of studied briefs in my
earlier research.
80 The balance of this paragraph is largely lifted from id. at 949–50.
81 Id. at 949; see also Seung Min Kim, Dem Lawmakers Back Brief Supporting
Obama’s Immigration Action, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2016/03/obama-immigration-action-democrats-amicus-brief-220419 [http://perma.cc/BH6G4L5N]; Tal Kopan, Congressional Democrats Join Court Challenge to Trump’s Travel Ban,
CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 15, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/
democrats-amicus-brief-trump-travel-ban/index.html [http://perma.cc/9YT3-CFG4].
82 Devins, supra note 10, at 949–50.
83 Id. at 950.
78
79
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over time. The flashpoint in these briefs is the underlying
policy issue and not the more abstract question regarding the
scope of congressional power. For reasons I will now detail,
changes in the role of institutional counsel in Congress also
demonstrate growing partisanship and polarization in separation
of powers disputes.
C.

Polarization and the Changing Role of Institutional Counsel
Party polarization has reshaped the role of institutional
counsel. Gone are the days where institutional counsel served as
a bulwark against a too powerful executive—defending the House
and Senate in separation of powers lawsuits, typically speaking
the voice for both Democrats and Republicans.84 Indeed, in the
period before polarization, lawmakers typically did not file
amicus briefs and typically backed Congress as an institution
when they did file amicus briefs.85 At that time, the House and
Senate counsel often worked in tandem, participating in the
same cases and advancing the shared institutional interests
of the House and Senate in a strong Congress.86 Today,
House-Senate differences are on prominent display as
polarization has transformed the role of institutional counsel in
ways that reflect profound differences between the House and
Senate.
The Senate counsel was designed to reflect Senate norms of
bipartisanship and consensus. From 1978 (when the Office of
Senate Legal Counsel was first created) until 1995, the Senate
counsel regularly participated in litigation involving the
separation of powers. However, polarization has made bipartisan
consensus next to impossible; as a result, the Senate counsel is
largely moribund in the very separation of powers disputes that
were core to the creation of the office. With one notable exception
(that I will soon discuss), the Senate counsel has not locked horns
with the executive and defended congressional prerogatives
before the Supreme Court in any separation of powers dispute
since 1995.87 For example, in a 2014 dispute over the president’s
See Devins, supra note 10, at 950.
See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 617; Devins, supra note 10, at 950.
See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 614–22 (discussing efforts of House and
Senate counsel to coordinate filings in separation of powers litigation).
87 See id. at 617; see also Neal Devins, Counsel Rests, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2014, 5:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/01/the_senate_s_lawy
er_doesn_t_participate_in_important_litigation_against.html [http://perma.cc/3T3R-EU3N].
In a 2015 dispute regarding a federal statute intended to facilitate the collection of money
judgments brought by victims of terrorists acts, the Senate Counsel and Department of
Justice both filed amicus briefs backing up congressional authority. See Brief for the U.S.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310
(2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412676; Brief of Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of
84
85
86
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purported end-running of the Senate’s confirmation power
through the use of recess appointments, the Senate counsel stood
on the sidelines while counsel for Senate Republicans filed briefs
and made oral arguments before both the D.C. Circuit and
Supreme Court.88
The one case where the Senate counsel did participate,
Zivtofsky v. Kerry, is the exception that proves the rule. The issue
in Zivtofsky was whether Congress could override State
Department policy to disallow individuals born in Jerusalem to
claim on their passports that they were born in Israel (so that
their passports would designate their birthplace as Jerusalem
and not Israel).89 Senate Democrats and Republicans did not
come together to defend Senate prerogatives; they came together
to support Israel. Lawmakers who signed amicus briefs in the
case included some of the most liberal Democrats and some of the
most conservative Republicans.90 These lawmakers regularly
signed onto single party briefs in other cases, but were united in
their support of Israel. Indeed, while 333 signatories of a proCongress amicus brief signed a letter to President Obama
affirming the “commitment to the unbreakable bond that exists
between our country and the state of Israel,”91 no member of the
Zivotofsky coalition spoke about the case’s separation of powers
implications on either the House or Senate floor.92
On the House side, polarization has played out in
fundamentally different ways, reflecting the fact that the House
counsel speaks the voice of the House majority. During periods of
unified government, the House typically leaves the president
alone—seeing the president as the leader of their party and
the Office of Legal Counsel in Support of Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.
Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412677.
88 See Devins, supra note 87. For their part, Senate Democrats too stood on the
sidelines, not wanting to embrace a circumscribed confirmation power and not wanting to
join Senate Republicans in their efforts to limit Obama administration efforts to fill
judicial and administrative vacancies. Id. In Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Obama
administration arguments and backed a larger Senate role.
89 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081–83 (2015). The Supreme Court ruled
that the president has complete power of recognition and that Congress cannot override
that power by statute. Id. at 2096.
90 Devins, supra note 10, at 954.
91 Letter by Representatives Steny Hoyer and Eric Cantor to Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton Reaffirming the U.S.-Israel Alliance, AIPC (Mar. 26, 2010),
https://www.aipac.org/-/media/publications/policy-and-politics/source-materials/congress
ional-action/2010/3_26_10__letter_to_secretary_of_state_re_us_commitment_to_israeli_
security_and_middle_east_peace.ashx. That letter was sent by 333 House members; a
nearly identical letter was sent by seventy-six Senators. See Ben Smith, 76 Senators Sign
on to Israel Letter, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/2010/04/76-senators-sign-on-to-israel-letter-026380 [http://perma.cc/N5GN-Y4CG].
92 Devins, supra note 10, at 954.
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someone to shield from opposition party criticism.93 Oversight is
lax and the president and House speaker sound similar messages
on the issues that divide the parties. Needless to say, the House
counsel is not engaged in litigation disputes with the White
House during periods of unified government.94
During periods of divided government, however, the House is
increasingly willing to challenge presidential actions in court,
including lawsuits against presidential initiatives and subpoena
enforcement actions. As discussed earlier, the Democratic House
sought to enforce subpoenas against the George W. Bush
administration and the Republican House likewise sought to
enforce subpoenas against the Obama administration.95 More
telling, the Republican House challenged Obama administration
implementation of the Affordable Care Act, claiming that the
administration “spent billions of unappropriated dollars to
support the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” and that
“under the guise of implementing regulations, effectively
amended the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate by
delaying its effect and narrowing its scope.”96 The House too has
pursued the defense of federal statutes that the executive refuses
to defend. Recent examples include Miranda override legislation

93 The Trump administration may ultimately become the exception that proves the
rule. At least until January 2018, however, Republicans in Congress—notwithstanding
some public criticism of the president—have largely backed President Trump and
certainly Republican lawmakers have not gone to court to challenge the president. See
Aaron Bycoffe, Tracking Congress in the Age of Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 14, 2016
3:24 PM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/ [http://perma.cc/
CG7L-YBV3]. Indeed, House Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit
his own bureaucracy by releasing a memo critical of the FBI. See supra note 59. At the
same time, there is reason to think that Republicans in Congress may see personal
advantage in criticizing the president and, as such, Congress may eventually step up its
oversight of the Trump administration. In late September 2017, for example, Republican
House overseers joined Democrats in seeking information regarding Trump
administration officials’ use of personal emails to conduct government business. See Mike
DeBonis, Gowdy Joins Democrats in Probing Trump Administration’s Use of Personal
Email, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
wp/2017/09/25/gowdy-joins-democrats-in-probing-trump-administration-use-of-personalemail/?utm_term=.174e3bea8e4a [http://perma.cc/EKE6-7ZAC].
94 The only exception is a low salience separation of powers dispute regarding the
Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1993. See Memorandum from Jennifer Casazza, DOJ
Decline Defense Congressional Participation 6 (on file with author) (discussing the House
Counsel’s participation in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton,
997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
95 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57.
96 U.S. House of Representatives. v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015).
The House also appeared as amicus in backing a state challenge to Obama administration
immigration initiatives. For additional discussion, see Brief for 172 Members of the U.S.
House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, infra note 106.
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(Dickerson v. United States) and the Defense of Marriage Act
(United States v. Windsor).97
Dickerson and Windsor reveal the profound impact of
polarization on the work of the House counsel. In periods of
divided government, the House counsel will advance majority
party preferences. In part, this means that the House counsel
will engage in disputes that have nothing to do with the
separation of powers—as the focus is advancing the policy
agenda of the House (and, for reasons discussed, separation of
powers gives way to social issues when Congress is polarized).98
In part, this means that the minority party in Congress will
publicly take issue with the House counsel. In both Dickerson
and Windsor, the House minority filed a competing brief to make
clear that the House counsel was both wrong on the merits and
spoke only for the majority party.99 Institutional power disputes
follow a similar script. The minority party will make competing
filings and the House counsel will focus her energies on highly
politicized matters, especially investigations intended to
embarrass high-ranking Executive Branch officials. Recent
examples include Democratic investigations of the U.S.
Attorneys’ firings under George W. Bush and Republican
investigations of Attorney General Eric Holder’s handling of the
Fast and Furious gun smuggling scheme.100
In today’s polarized Congress, the House and Senate counsel
no longer represent Congress’s institutional interests in disputes
with the president. The Senate counsel is largely enfeebled by
bipartisanship requirements. The House counsel represents the
majority party and is only interested in checking the president
during periods of divided government. Moreover, the House
counsel largely limits her intervention to highly politicized
disputes that divide Republicans and Democrats—so much
so that the minority party increasingly rebuts House counsel
filings with opposition briefs. Finally, as was true with
lawmaker amicus filings, institutional disputes are less critical
to institutional counsel and the social issues that divide the
97 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
98 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57.
99 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership in Support of
Petitioner, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), 2000 WL
126192; Jennifer Bendery, Defense of Marriage Act: House Republicans Tie Federal Gay
Marriage Ban to House Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/01/02/defense-of-marriage-act_n_2399383.html [http://perma.cc/3XJR-ZC64].
100 See Shenon, supra note 56; Brian Montopoli, So Is This U.S. Attorney
Purge Unprecedented Or Not?, CBS N EWS (Mar. 14, 2007, 5:17 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/so-is-this-us-attorney-purge-unprecedented-or-not/
[http://perma.cc/73UP-WEHQ]; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57.
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parties are increasingly likely to spill over to the work of
institutional counsel.
III. CONCLUSION: WHY EXPANDING LAWMAKER STANDING IS NOT
THE SOLUTION TO CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION
In turning back a lawsuit by members of Congress who
challenged the Reagan administration for subverting Congress’s
war making powers by backing the Contras, then-judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg claimed that “Congress has formidable weapons
at its disposal—the power of the purse and investigative
resources far beyond those available in the Third Branch. . . . ‘If
the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our
task to do so.’”101 This claim made sense in 1985 and even in 1993
when Judge Ginsburg was confirmed to the Supreme Court by a
resounding bipartisan vote of 96–3;102 at that time, the seeds of
polarization were planted but had not yet taken hold of Congress.
Today, the natural disinclinations of lawmakers to invest in
Congress as an institution have metastasized. The era of
presidential unilateralism has now taken hold as Congress lacks
the will and way to check the president and advance its
institutional interests.103
The question remains: Should the courts fill that void by
providing avenues for disappointed lawmakers to challenge the
president? After all, our system of checks and balances
anticipates some check on presidential unilateralism and judicial
intervention seems far more likely than Congress coming
together in a bipartisan way to place limits on presidential
entreaties. For institutionally minded lawmakers, court filings
may be the only real vehicle available to check the president’s
expansionist tendencies.
For the balance of this essay, I will explain why
polarization does not cut in favor of an expanded judicial
role—notwithstanding the fact that polarization cuts against

101 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir 1985) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
102 Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Confirms Judge Ginsburg as a Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/04/us/senate-96-3-easilyaffirms-judge-ginsburg-as-a-justice.html.
103 As noted earlier, the Trump administration may become the exception that proves
this rule. See Moe & Howell, supra note 4, at 138. Republicans (as of January 2018) are
generally backing the president and, consequently, reinforcing the central claims of this
essay. That may change and that change may add nuance to the claims made in this
paper. Nonetheless, I truly doubt that the actions of Congress during the Trump era will
undermine my central claims regarding congressional incentives. Furthermore, a tick up
in congressional oversight would cut in favor of my bottom line conclusions regarding
legislator standing to challenge the executive in court.
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Congress asserting its institutional prerogatives through the
legislative process. My argument is two-fold. First, lawmakers
will increasingly turn to the courts for partisan ends and,
relatedly, it is increasingly likely that there will be competing
factions of Democratic and Republican filings. In other words,
lawmakers will see courts as one more vehicle to articulate party
preferences and call attention to differences between the two
parties. These lawmakers speak for their political party; they do
not speak Congress’s institutional voice.
Consider four recent cases where the House of Representatives
squared off against the Obama administration—Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder (where the
House sued Attorney General Holder for failing to turn over
requested documents in its Fast and Furious investigation);
United States House of Representatives v. Burwell (where the
House sued the Obama administration for implementing the
Affordable Care Act in ways that allegedly undermined House
prerogatives); United States v. Windsor (where the House
defended before the Supreme Court the DOMA after the Obama
administration refused to defend); and United States v. Texas
(where the House appeared before the Supreme Court as amicus
to challenge Obama’s immigration directive).104 In all four cases,
Republican lawmakers sought to embarrass the Obama
administration and/or advance favored policy priorities in the
courts;105 in all four cases, Democratic lawmakers filed competing
briefs defending the Obama administration.106 Needless to say, if
Democrats controlled the House there would be a raft of lawsuits
challenging the Trump administration.107 Indeed, Democratic

104 See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2013); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2016); United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
105 See Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 56 (discussing Holder); see also Burwell, 130 F.
Supp. 3d 53; Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19 (discussing DOMA); Brief for
Amicus Curiae the United States House of Representatives in Support of Respondents,
United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 1377718.
106 See Yager, supra note 58; Brief of Amicus Curiae Members of Congress in Support
of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell,
130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844; Brief of
172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the
Merits, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840029;
Brief of 186 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 39 Members of the U.S.
Senate as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134
(5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-647), 2016 WL 891342.
107 For this very reason, there are real costs to a regime in which institutional counsel
for the House have standing to speak the House’s voice without allowing minority party
lawmakers access to the courts to raise institutional power claims. Specifically, during
periods of unified government, Congress would be mute. See Bycoffe, supra note 93.
During periods of divided government, Congress would be active—but only presidential
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state Attorneys Generals have launched more than a dozen
lawsuits against the Trump administration and Democrats in
Congress have also launched lawsuits.108 For example, almost
200 Congressional Democrats have filed a lawsuit claiming that
President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause by
accepting benefits from foreign states without first seeking to
obtain the consent of Congress.109
There is little question that opposition party lawmakers are
now locked and loaded; they will go to court whenever possible to
strengthen their base, advance their agenda, and—whenever
possible—embarrass the president. None of this is to say that the
House and Senate never have standing to defend institutional
prerogatives. Indeed, I have previously written (with Tara Grove)
that House and Senate counsel can seek judicial enforcement of
subpoenas.110 In particular, the House and Senate need not act as
a bicameral body when it comes to implementing the “rules
of . . . proceedings” of their respective chambers;111 it therefore

opponents would speak Congress’s voice. To the extent that the Supreme Court signaled
potential approval of such a regime in Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2015), the Court should rethink its approach to lawmaker
and institutional standing. For further discussion of the Arizona case, see Sant’Ambrogio,
supra note 2, at 1540.
108 See Michael Levenson, Maura Healey’s Top Target These Days is Donald Trump,
BOS. GLOBE (June 24, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/23/healey/
8C3t7IXZZWENRHKllVqbIK/story.html [http://perma.cc/R9ET-ZK63]. For a particularly
revealing look at the efforts of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s efforts to
wage legal warfare with President Trump, see Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum,
New York’s Attorney General in Battle with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/26/nyregion/eric-schneiderman-attorney-general-newyork.html?_r=0.
109 See Blumenthal v. Trump, Complaint, No. 17-cv-01154, 2017 WL 2561946 (D.D.C.
June 14, 2017). A related lawsuit filed by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington was dismissed for want of standing. See David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan
O’Connell, Judge dismisses lawsuit alleging Trump violated Constitution, WASH. POST,
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judge-dismisses-lawsuitalleging-trump-violated-constitution/2017/12/21/31011510-e697-11e7-ab50-621fe058
8340_story.html?utm_term=.0c2df9144622 [http://perma.cc/V78R-PK6C].
110 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 597–603, 622. The House also may have
standing in ongoing (as of fall 2017) litigation regarding the appropriations power and
Obama-era enforcement of the Affordable Care Act. Specifically, since the Constitution
mandates that appropriations legislation originates in the House, the House arguably
suffers a distinct injury when presidential action allegedly undermines House
appropriations authority. In Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 58, federal district judge
Rosemary Collyer found standing for this reason. On December 15, 2017, Collyer’s
standing holding was effectively ratified by a settlement between the Trump
administration, House Republicans, and Democractic Attorneys General. See Anna Edney
& Andrew M. Harris, Obamacare Subsidy Lawsuit Settled by White House, Democrats,
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Dec. 15, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-12-15/obamacare-subsidy-lawsuit-settled-by-white-house-democrats
[http://perma.cc/6WEC-X5FK].
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The fact that either chamber might have authority to
seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas does not mean that judicial resolution is superior
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stands to reason that each chamber can pursue investigations as
well as issue and enforce subpoenas as a unilateral body. At the
same time, these lawsuits come at a cost in this age of polarized
politics. Lawmakers are not motivated to use litigation to
advance Congress’s institutional interests; the focus of litigation
is partisan gain and Democrats and Republicans will simply use
the courts as another field of battle to engage in partisan battles
with each other. Again, that is not to say that lawmakers or
institutional counsel are without standing; my concern is
whether polarization—as a policy matter—weighs in favor or
against congressional standing.
My second argument against congressional lawsuits is that
they embroil the courts in highly partisan political fights and
that the courts pay a price for being embroiled in such overtly
political litigation. Starting in 2010, the Supreme Court became a
partisan Court—all of the Republican-nominated Justices are
now to the right of all of the Democratic-nominated Justices.112
Polarization has fueled this partisan divide and Senate
Democrats and Republicans have both exacerbated this divide by
engaging in party-line voting on judicial nominees and, relatedly,
by ending the filibuster.113 When Barack Obama was president
and Democrats controlled the Senate, Democrats broke a
Republican logjam on lower court nominees by ending the
filibuster for such nominees.114 When Republicans gained control,
they blocked Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland
by claiming that the 2016 election should decide who appoints
the next Supreme Court Justice.115 And after Democrats
filibustered Trump nominee Neil Gorsuch, the majority
Republican Senate ended the filibuster of Supreme Court
nominees and confirmed Gorsuch on a near party line vote.116
to informal political bargaining. See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information
Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110, 130–32 (1996).
112 See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301 (2017).
113 Id. at 323–25.
114 Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters
on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/
2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0fd2ca728e67c_story.html?utm_term=5cf247d3b95a
[http://perma.cc/GJ4F-AZDA].
115 Mitch McConnell & Chuck Grassley, McConnell and Grassley: Democrats
Shouldn’t Rob Voters of Chance to Replace Scalia, W ASH. P OST (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mcconnell-and-grassley-democrats-shouldnt-robvoters-of-chance-to-replace-scalia/2016/02/18/e5ae9bdc-d68a-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.
html?utm_term=.b97a5e7c3539 [http://perma.cc/F6KX-9PXB].
116 Russell Berman, Republicans Abandon the Filibuster to Save Neil Gorsuch,
THE A TLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/
republicans-nuke-the-filibuster-to-save-neil-gorsuch/522156/ [http://perma.cc/A4LD-9G66].
Senate Republicans also did away with the blue slip (allowing home state Senators to
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Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the
courts—especially the Supreme Court—are increasingly seen
as another political, partisan institution.117 The Court, as the
Justices have recognized, must “speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions.”118 Indeed, to preserve their
reputation as a collegial court, most Supreme Court Justices
have spoken against the politicization of the Judiciary.119
Correspondingly, after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the
Justices committed themselves to deciding cases unanimously
and to avoid partisan 4–4 deadlocks.120
Judicial resolution of congressional lawsuits cuts against
these efforts of the Court to preserve its reputation as a court of
law. For reasons discussed, congressional lawsuits are
increasingly likely to be seen as partisan. And while some of these
lawsuits will be filed by institutionalists interested in defending
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives, it is nonetheless the case
that judicial rulings on President Trump and the Emoluments
Clause, or President Obama’s implementation of the Affordable
Care Act, will both be seen as partisan and will dwarf nonpartisan
efforts to, say, preserve Congress’s war-making authority. Again,
it may be that lawmakers or institutional counsel already possess
block judicial nominees) when then-Senator Al Franken sought to hold up the nomination
of Seventh Circuit judge David Stras. See Kevin Freking, Senate confirms David Stras for
Court of Appeals despite Al Franken withholding support, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS
(Jan. 30, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/01/30/senate-confirms-david-strasfor-court-of-appeals-despite-al-franken-withholding-support/ [http://perma.cc/S4JZ-SGYA].
117 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court is a Political Court. Republicans’ Actions
are Proof, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thesupreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-proof/2016/03/09/4c851860-e14211e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade1_story.html?utm_term=.c21993986959 [http://perma.cc/8B6n-Z3G2].
118 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992)
(plurality opinion). In quoting this language, I do not mean to suggest that the Court does
or should follow public opinion.
119 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, The Political Wars Damage Public Perception of the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts Says, W ASH . P OST (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/the-political-wars-damage-publicperception-of-supreme-court-chief-justice-roberts-says/2016/02/04/80e718b6-cb0c-11e5a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html?utm_term=.1723d547a198 [http://perma.cc/725G-A48V];
Ryan Lovelace, Sonia Sotomayor Saddened by Perception of Judges as Political, WASH.
EXAMINER (Mar. 10, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/Sonia-sotomayorsaddened-by-perception-of-judges-as-political/article/2617019 [http://perma.cc/ZUY4-W8FE];
Catherine Lutz, Justice Elena Kagan Talks Power on the Supreme Court, ASPEN INST.
(July 18, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/ supreme-court-associate-justiceelena-kagan-power-court/ [http://perma.cc/93MK-DPM4]; Lincoln Caplan, A Workable
Democracy, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2017), http://harvardmagazine.com/2017/03/a-workabledemocracy [http://perma.cc/7LTC-2TBX].
120 See Adam Liptak, Rulings and Remarks Tell Divided Story of an 8-Member
Supreme Court, N.Y. T IMES (May 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/
us/politics/rulings-and-remarks-tell-divided-story-of-an-8-member-supreme-court.html;
Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/supreme-courtterm-consensus.html.
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constitutional standing to bring such suits. Nonetheless, party
polarization cuts against the bringing of those lawsuits and is
reason for the courts to move cautiously before expanding
congressional standing.121
In arguing against congressional standing, I understand full
well that I am embracing presidential unilateralism. As Justice
Jackson wrote in the Steel Seizure case, “[t]he tools belong to the
man who can use them.”122 Congress is not likely to use its tools; it
is naturally disinclined to stand up for institutional prerogatives
and party polarization further cuts against Congress asserting its
prerogatives. Nonetheless, the courts should not seek to prop
Congress up by intervening in cases where standing is not clearly
established. Today’s Congress is a cacophony of competing sound
bites by Democrats and Republicans. Amicus curiae filings by
lawmakers and institutional counsel provide an appropriate
vehicle for the expression of the myriad interests of lawmakers
and political parties. Congressional lawsuits are not such a
vehicle; those lawsuits further expose partisan rifts in Congress
and are potentially harmful to the courts’ institutional standing.

121 The courts are generally reluctant to intervene and look for ways to avoid tackling
the merits in these disputes. Indeed, federal courts often seek end-runs where they do
not have to rule on standing. This is true of information access disputes. See
Complaint, supra note 109. It is also true of ongoing litigation regarding the
appropriations power—where the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is holding the case in
abeyance (starting December 5, 2016) rather than ruling on the lower court’s standing
determination. In this litigation, the House and Trump administration both support the
D.C. Circuit’s action. See Timothy Jost, Parties Ask Court to Keep Cost Sharing Reduction
Payment Litigation on Hold (Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2017),
http://healthaffairs.org/ blog/2017/02/21/parties-ask-court-to-keep-cost-sharing-reductionpayment-litigation-on-hold/ [http://perma.cc/2QUV-XPXE].
122 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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